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OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Claudio U. Ciborra
Institute Theseus, France
Universith di Trento, Italy
ABSTRACT
When building a Strategic Information System (SIS), it may not be economically sound for a firm to be
an innovator through the strategic deployment of information technology. The decreasing costs of the
technology and the power of imitation may quickly curtail any competitive advantage acquired through
SIS. On the other hand, the iron law of market competition prescribes that those who do not imitate
superior solutions are driven out of business. This means that any successful SIS becomes a
competitive necessity for every player in the industry. Tapping standard models of strategy analysis
and data sources for industry analysis will lead to similar systems and enhance, rather than decrease,
imitation. How then should a "true" SIS be developed? In order to avoid easy imitation, it should
emerge from the grassroots of the organization, out of end-user hacking computing and tinkering. In
this way, the innovative SIS is going to be highly entrenched with the specific culture of the firm. Top
management needs to appreciate local fluctuations in system practices as a repository of uniqueinnovations and commit adequate resources to their development, even if they fly in the face of
traditional approaches. Rather than looking for standard models in the business strategy literature,
SISs should be looked for in the theory and practice of organizational learning and innovation, bothincremental and radical.
1. INTRODUCTION and value experimentation at the grass roots level of
an organization as a means to finding new directions.In order to follow the pioneering examples of American
Airlines' Sabre, McKesson's Economost and American • Similarly, a careful ex,mination of precedent-settingHospital Supply's ASAP, current prescriptions for design- SISs provides evidence of important roles for serendip-
ing a Strategic Information System (SIS) include obtaining ity, reinvention, and other factors that are left out of
top management awareness and identifying and implement- account in the conventional approach to strategy
ing applications that may generate competitive advantage. development.
These systematic approaches are based on two main
ingredients: a set of guidelines indicating how Information There are both empirical and theoretical grounds, then, for
Technology (IT) can support the business vis-a-vis the proposing new kinds of guidelines for SIS design. After
competition and a plmining and implementation strategy issues associated with current SIS methodologies are(Bakos and Treacy 1986; Wiseman 1988; Ives and Lear- surfaced and the assumptions on which they rest have beenmonth 1984; Cash and Konsynski 1984; Porter and Millar reviewed, a quite different approach is proposed and
1985). justified.
After the 1980s generated a wealth of "how to build an Consider the following questions raised by current concep-
SIS" recipes, the nineties have begun with a period of tions of SIS design
critical reflection (Hopper 1990). The systematic applica-
tion of SIS design methodologies did not, in fact, yield a • Limitation has always been the driving force behind
commensurate number of successful cases - at least not the diffusion of any technological innovation (Rosen-
when measured against the pioneering technologies cited berg 1982). SIS represents no exception. However, if
above. An intensive review of relevant empirical and every major player in the industry adopts the same ortheoretical literature suggests a number of reasons for a similar SIS, any competitive advantage plainly
these discrepancies. evaporates. Systems that can be copied and built by
a large number of firms, where no firms enjoy any• The hand, the theoretical literature emphasizes distinctive or sustainable advantage in implementation
rational assessments of the firm and its environment can only generate normal economic returns. In parti-by top management as the means to strategy formula- cular, small firms are at a special disadvantage in
tion. It ignores alternative conceptions available in applying standard SIS planning approaches and solu-
innovation literature that stress learning over thinking tions in that they will find it very difficult to manipu-
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late the industry structure to their advantage through integrating unique ideas and practical design solutions
the strategic use of IT. at the end user level turns out to be more important
than the adoption of structured approaches to systems
• Some Inter-Organizational Systems (IOS) require the development or industry analysis (Schoen 1979;
connection of all the major firms in an industry, as is Ciborra and 1.anmra 1990).
the case for Electronic Data Interchange. This
undermines the competitive advantage such systems The paper first investigates the dilemmas of building an
are supposed to offer the individual firm Uohnston and SIS tracing them back to current views of strategic thinking
Vitale 1988). and models of competition (section 2). Such theories and
models are briefly reviewed in order to show that they
• More generally, the competitive analysis of markets represent just one possible approach, and that alternative
and the identification of SIS applications can be venues need to be explored for more effective SIS design
purchased as research and consulting services (Barney ( Section 3). A closer look at how some legendary SISs
1985a). They are carried out according to current were originally introduced offers clues for a different
frameworks, use standard data sources, and if per- approachbased on organizationallearning, bothincremen-
formed professionally will reach similar results and tal and radical (section 4). New principles for SIS develop-
systems. ment are then set out and justified in more detail (sections
5 and 6). Conclusions follow.
It is not surprising, then, that business organizations should
ask themselves:
2. QUESTIONABLE ADVANTAGE
• Does it really pay to be innovative?
The rhetoric of SIS is based on a set of cases ranging from
• Are SISs offering true competitive advantage, or do the early adopters such as McKesson (Clemons and Row
they just represent a competitive necessity? 1988), American Hospital Supply [now Baxter] (Venkatra-
man and Short 1990), and American Airlines (Copeland
• How can a firm implement systems that are not easily and McKenney 1988) to companies that went bankrupt
copied, thus generating returns over a reasonable because they did not adopt an SIS, such as Frontier
period of time? Airlines and People Express. The argument in favor of
SISs is backed by frameworks that indicate how to identify
In order to address such issues, researchers and consultants SIS applications: strategic thrusts (Wiseman 1988); the
are finding new ways to develop SIS (Clemons 1986; Feeny value chain (Porter and Millar 1985); the customer services
and Ives 1989; Venkatraman and Short 1990). Those life cycle (Ives and Learmonth 1984); the strategic grid
efforts do not typically challenge the current assumptions (McFarlan 1984); electronic integration (Henderson and
about business strategy formulation and industry competi- Venkatraman 1989); and transaction costs (Ciborra 1987;
tion. They are likely to be thwarted by the paradox of Malone, Yates and Benjamin 1987).1
microeconomics: competition tends to force standaIdiza-
tion of solutions and equalization of production and Much less attention has been given to the problem of how
coordination costs among participants. To be sure, all an SIS can provide a significant or sustainable competitive
these dynamics unfold unless a firm's strategy is hard to advantage, so that a pioneering company can get a valuable
copy (Barney 1985a): the more difficult it is for other performance edge extract from a strategic IT application.
firms to imitate a successful SIS, the longer the firm can In fact, the widely cited SIS success stories often show that
obtain a performance advantage. such systems provide only an ephemeral advantage, before
being readily copied by competitors (Vitale 1986).2 This
We argue that the construction, or better the invention, of contention is confirmed by empirical evidence on the
an SIS must be grounded on new foundations, both patterns of diffusion of SISs.
practically and conceptiiAlly. More specifically,
A recent study of 36 major IOSs in different US industries
• to avoid easy imitation, the quest for an SIS must be shows that although the goals set by large corporations
based on unanalyzable, and even opaque, areas such differed considerably (e.g., decreasing costs electronic
as organizational culture. The investigation and integration), the driving force for the introduction of such
enactment of unique sources of practice and know how systems was that other firms in the same industry had
at the firm and industry level can be the source of similar applications (75% of the cases); other systems were
sustained advantage. developed in collaboration with companies in the same
industry (8%), while for another 8% they were individual
• developing an SIS is much closer to prototyping and initiatives soon to be copied by competitors. In sum, "more
to deploying end users' ingenuity than has been than 92% of the systems studied follow industry wide
realized (Brown and Duguid 1989). In fact, many SIS trends. Only three systems are really original, but they will
have emerged out of plain hacking. The capability of probably be promptly imitated" (Brousseau 1990).
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Asaconsequence, aiming at sustainable advantagerequires More generally, this school of thought can be questioned
continuously generating innovative and competitive on three counts (Mintzberg 1990).
applications and then successfully protecting that unique
advantage over some time period. Feeny and Ives (1989) - Making strategy explicit The rational bias for full
recommend, for example, that in order to reap a long term explicit articulation of strategy assumes, implicitly, that
advantage from investments in an SIS, a firm should theenvironmentishighly predictableandtheunfoldingcarefully analyze the lead time required for competitors to of events is itself sequenced, to allow for an orderly
develop a system similar to the one being considered and process of formulation, design and implementation.
it should look for asymmetries in organizational structure, However, during implementation surprises often occur
culture, size, etc., that may slow down the integration of that call into question carefully developed plans
the new SIS within competitors' organizations. (Bikson Stasz and Mankin 1985). The need for
continuous opportunistic revisions clashes with the
Although such suggestions are very valuable, they do not inflexibility of the formulation and implementation
entirely avoid the dilemmas faced by SIS design. For sequence.
example, if it is possible for the innovator to employ a
consulting service to identify specific forces that can keep • One-woy relationship between strategy and structure.
followers and imitators at bay, the latter can always acquire In the conventional perspective, the strategist is
consultants and services to help overcome those impedi- regarded as an independent observer who can exercise
ments. We claim, instead, that more effective tactics for judgement in a way that is removed from the everyday
SIS design will come from challenging the approaches to reality of the organization. For example, when
strategy formulation that characterized the SIS field of the evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the organiii-
1980s. tion, or assessing the critical success factors, it is
assumed that strategists can think and make choices
3. SHIFTS IN MODELS OF STRATEGIC outside of the influence of frames of reference, cultural
THINKING AND COMPETITION biases, or ingrained, routinird ways of acting.
Although a considerable body of research literature
It is appropriate to begin by considering the rational shows that such biases are at work in any decision
perspective on strategy fonnulation, applied by authors making process (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), they
such as Porter and Millar (1985), from the business are assumed away by the rationalist orientation of
strategy to current SIS issues. According to such a most approaches to strategic systems. Everyday life in
perspective, management should first engage in a purely orgnni ,tions, on the other hand, shows that organi,M.
cognitive process: through the appraigal of the environ- tional structure, culture, inertia and other endemic
ment, its threats and opportunities as well as the strengths phenomena influence the strategy formulation process,
and weaknesses of the organization, key success factors and in addition to unexpected implementation outcomes
distinctive competencies are identified; next, these are (Weick 1979).
translated into a range of competitive strategy alternatives.
There, once the optimal strategy has been selected, and , Thinking or learning. Strategy formation tends to be
laid out in sufficient detail, the implementation phase seen as an intentional design process, rather than asfollows. the continuous acquisition of knowledge in various
forms, i.e., learning. We claim, on the other hand, that
A perspective of this type can be found in most SIS · strategy formulation is often likely to involve elements
models, such as the critical success factors (Rockart 1979), of surprise or sudden, radical shifts in preferences and
the value chain (Porter and Millar 1985), strategic thrusts goals, as well as vicious circles that may stifle its
(Wiseman 1988), and sustainability analysis (Feeny and development and implementation (Bateson 1972;Ives 1989). However, in everyday practice strategy formu- Argyris 1982; Masuch 1985). Hence, strategic decision
lation differs widely from what is implied by such prescrip- making must be based on effective adaptation and
tions and assumptions. Incrementalism, muddling through learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985; Lcvitt and March 1988)
myopic, and evolutionary decision making processes seem - both incremental trial-and-error learning, and
to prevail, even when there is a formal adherence to the radical second-order learning (Argyris and Schoen
principles outlined above. Structures tend to influence 1978). Radical learning permits ways of seeing the
strategy formulation befon they can be impacted by the environment, and commensurate views of the organiza-
new vision, and the de facto involvement of actors other tion's strengths and weaknesses, to be continuously
than the chief executive officer is prevalent. Conflicts and reshaped (Ciborra and Schneider 1990).
double bind situations may characterize the stage where
strategies are conceived and put to work. Perhaps the It is appropriate next to consider the models of competi-
most notable counterevidence is provided by the theory tion that are implicit in today's SIS frameworks. Most rely
and practice of Japanese management, at the same time so on theories of business strategy (Porter 1980) derived from
successful and so distant from the analytic - even mecha- industrial organization economics (Bain 1968). According
nistic - principles set out above (Nonaka 1988a). to this school of thought, returns to firms are determined
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by the structure of the industry within which the firms terminals Minitel) - will now be reconsidered for the light
operate. In order to achieve a competitive advantage, they can shed on these issues. At a closer look, such cases
firmsshould manipulatethe structuralcharacteristicsof the emphasize the discrepancy between ideal plans for an SIS
industry through IT - for instance, by creating barriers to and the realities of implementation.
entry, product differentiation, links with suppliers, and so
on (Porter and Millar 1985). However, as Barney (1985a) ASAP, the system launched by AHS Corporation (subse-
has noted ill the field of strategy and Wiseman (1988) in quently acquired by Baxter), started as an operational,
the field of SIS, there are alternative conceptions of localized response to a customer need (Venkatraman and
competition that may be relevant to SIS development. Short 1990). Because of difficulties in serving a hospital
effectively, a manager of a local AHS office gave pre-
One contrasting alternative is the theory of monopolistic punched cards to the hospital's purchacing department; the
competition put forward by Chamberlin (1933) on this ordering clerks could then transfer the information on the
view: firms are heterogeneous. They compete on the cards expeditiously through a phone terminal. From this
basis of certain resource and asset differences, such as local ad hoc solution to a particular problem, the idea
technical know-how, reputation, ability for teamwork, gradually emerged of linking all the customer hospitals in
organizational culture and skills, and other "invisible assets" the same way through touch-tone telephones, bar code
(Itami 198D. Differences of these kinds will make some readers, teletypes and eventually PCs. At a later stage,
firms able to implement high return strategies. Competi- AHS management realized the positive impact such an
tion then means cultivating unique strengths and capa- electronic link with the customers could have on profits
bilities, and defending them against imitation by other and was able to allocate adequate resources for its further
firms. development.
Another perspective on competition is Schumpeter's McKesson's Economost, another order-entry system,
(1950), who sees it as a process linked to innovation in started in a similar way. The former IS manager admits
product, market or technology. Innovation, in turn, is that "behind the legend" there was simply a local initiative
more the outcome of the capitalist process of creative by one of the business units. The system was not deve-
destruction than the result of a strategic planning process. loped according to a company-wide strategic plan; rather,
Ability at guessing, learning and sheer luck appear in such it was the outcome of an evolutionary, piecemeal process
a perspective to be key competitive factors (Barney 1985b). that included the ingenuous tactical use of systems already
available. Economost was"stumbled upon" almost acciden-
It is noteworthy that Chamberlin's and Schumpeter's tally, the outcome of what the French call bricolage, i.e.,
concepts of competition are consistent with the alternative tinkering and serendipity. Interestingly, the conventional
models of strategy formulation depicted by Mintzberg in MIS unit not only was responsible for initial neglect of the
his critique of rational analytic approaches. More pre- new strategic applications within McKesson, but also,
cisely, we can identify and contrast two different "themes" subsequently, for the slow pace of companrwide learning
in business strategy that can be applied to the SIS field. about McKesson's new information systems.
According to the first strategy is formulated in advance, on
the basis of an industry analysis; it consists of a series of SABRE, the pioneering computerized reservation system
moves that can be planned and subsequently implemented, built by American Airlines, was not originally conceived as
to gain an advantage relative to competing firms in the a biased distribution channel to create entry barriers for
same industry structure. According to the second theme, competitors while tying in travel agents. In fact, it began
strategy formulation is difficult to plan before the fact, and as a relatively simple, inventory-management system
competitive advantage stems from exploiting the unique addressing a specific need which had nothing to do with
characteristics of the firm and unleashing its innovating ensuring a competitive advantage. On the contrary, it was
capabilities. supposed to address an internal inefficiency: American's
relative inability, compared to other airlines, to monitor the
Looking more closely at some well known SIS applications inventory of available seats and to attribute passenger
suggests that there is a wide gap between the prevailing names to booked seats (Hopper 1990).
methodologies, close to the former theme, and business
practice, definitely closer to the latter. A last telling case, at national level, is represented by
Minitel. One of the rare - if not the only - successful
public Videotex systems in the world, it gives France a still
unmatched competitive advantage in the infonnatisation
4. RECONSIDERING THE EMPIRICAL de la societe (Nora and Minc 1978). Today there are 5.6
EVIDENCE million terminals in French households and an average of
eighteen calls a month per owner.
Four well known SISs, Baxter's ASAP, McKesson's
Economost, American Airline's SABRE and the French The initial Minitel idea was not unique. Mainframes allow
Videotex, Teletel (better known by the name of the P'IT the creation of large centralized databases providing
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information that could be sold and accessed by a large 5. NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR SIS DESIGN
number of customers using dumb terminals. Videotex
systems promoted on this basis have failed both for early The preceding discussion of the models of competition
adopters (UK FIT) and latecomers (the German Bundes- suggested that if an SIS application does not generate
post) that could have benefitted from better technology, significant value, it may not be worth developing. If it is
more careful planning, and the experiences of other PTI's. easily imitated, it can only deliver a short term, contestable
France Telecom (formerly Direction Generale des Tele- advantage (Wiseman 1988). The question is, then, how to
communications, or DGT) moved into Videotex relatively achieve uniqueness in SIS design - or at least a system
late. However, there were significant differences in the difficult to emulate - if models of strategic thinking and
way the system was promoted to the general public. The competitive environments proposed in the 1980s are
vision of the infonnalisation de la societe convinced the adequate?
government to make the Minitel a success story through
the diffusion of millions of free terminals. In fact, its free We claim that the development of an SIS that can deliver
distribution is seen by observers and competitors as the a sustained competitive advantage must be treated as an
critical success factor for French Videotex. This is only innovation process (Takeuchi and Nonaka 1986; Nonaka
partially true. The free terminals were at the time a and Yamanaouchi 1989). To innovate means to create new
necessary condition for success (recall that the launching knowledge about resources, goals, tasks markets, products
of Minitel occurred before the diffusion of the personal and processes. The skills and competencies available in a
computer) but not a sufficient one. Nonetheless, at the corporation represent at the same time sources and
beginning the use of Minitel was sluggish, probably for the constraints for innovation (Prahalad and Hamel 1990).
same reason other Videotex systems never took off.
The creation of new knowledge can take place in two
nonexclusive ways. The first is to rely on local information
To be successful, the Minitel had to be different from and routine behavior, extending them gradually when
other media; it had to be "active.' In fact, the system also coping with a new task (examples include learning by
provided messaging capabilities, but was never promoted doing incremental decision making, and muddling
as a public e-mail service by the DGT. Only because an through). Accessing more diverse and distant information,
act of hacking attracted the interest of the national press when an adequate level of competence is not present,
was this potential discovered and actualized by millions of would instead lead to errors and further divergence from
users. During an experiment in Strasbourg, when a local optimal performance (Heiner 1983).
newspaper put its classified ads section on videote,4 a
hacker - probably located at the dp unit of the newspaper This approach requires allowing and even encouraging
itself - started using the Minitcl to respond to the ads tinkering by people close to the operational level so that
establishing a direct, electronic dialogue with their authors. they can combine and apply known tools and techniques to
This was the beginning of the Minitel as an electronic mail solve new problems. No general scheme or model is
system (messagerie) instead ofjust a system for accessing available; rather, local cues from a situation are trusted
a database (Marchand 198D. At that point, the number and exploited in a somewhat unreflective way, aiming at ad
of terminals in homes turned out to constitute a critical hoc solutions by heuristics rather than high theory.
mass, starting a virtual circle. For instance, the network Systems like ASAP or the Minitel were developed in this
created a new marketplace where many independent way. Even when big plans were present, it was b,icolage
service companies could sell their services. Customers that lead to the innovation. The value of tinkering lies in
immediately used the "new" medium - so much so that the the fact that it keeps the development of an SIS close to
national backbone packet switched network, Transpac, the competencies of the organization and to on-going
broke down due to overload. France Telecom was flexible fluctuations in local practices.
and pragmatic enough to adapt the infrastructure techni-
cally and commercially to the new pattern of usage which The second route to new knowledge is to attack the
had emerged outside the initial vision and plans; it moved competency gap directly, forging new competencies to
"from the logic of storage to the logic of traffic" (Schneider emerge and consolidate. This is a process of radical
et al. 1990). learning that entails restructuring the cognitive and
organiintional backgrounds that give meaning to the
practices, routines and skills at hand (Brown 1991). This
The most frequently cited SIS successes of the 1980s, then approach leads to new systems and arrangements, but not
tell the same story. Innovative SISs are not fully designed by "random walks" or tinkering; at the opposite extreme,
top-down or introduced in one shot; rather, they are tried it intentionally challenges and smashes established routines
out through prototyping and tinkering. In contrast, strategy in particular, it attacks day-to-day assumptions that define
formulation and design take place in pre-existing cognitive competence, learning by doing and learning by trial and
frames and organizational contexts that usually prevent error. From this view point, designing an innovative SIS
designers and sponsors from seeing and exploiting the would involve more than market analysis systems analysis
potential for innovation. requirements specifications and interest accommodation.
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Rather, it should deal primarily with the structures and 1990). We identify seven oxymorons as alternative "plan-
frames within which such exercises take place, i.e., with ning" guidelines that can increase organizational skill in
shaping and restructuring the context of both business developing an SIS. The first four oxymorons are aimed at
policy and systems development. Such a context can be transformingb*colage and learning-by-doing into activities
surfaced and changed onlyby interveningin situations and that increase the probability of "stumbling upon" SIS
designing-in-action (Schoen 1979; Ciborra and Lanzara applications: The other three set the conditions for
1990). radical learning and innovation.
To bolster incremental learning
Once a background context has been restructured-in-
action, participants in the setting are free to devise new 1. Value bricolage strategically. The more volatile the
strategies and to look at both the environment and markets and the technologies, the more likely it is that
Organi tional capabilities in radically new ways. New effective solutions will be embedded in everyday
strategic information and supporting systems can then be experience and local knowledge. This is the petrie
generated, based on the unique new worldview the de- dish for tinkering; here creative applications that have
signers and users are able to adopt. As an outcome, strategic impact will be invented, engineered, and tried
organizations and SIS should be very different from out.
standard solutions and also very difficult to imitate,
because they imply that competitors should abandon not 2. Design tinkering. Activities, settings and systems have
only their old practices and conceptions, but also the to be arranged so that invention and prototyping by
contexts in which they routinely solve problems, run end users can flourish, together with open experimen-
existing systems, and build new ones. tation (Bikson, Gutek and Mankin 1985). It requires
setting up organizational arrangements that favor local
This accounts quite well for what has happened in the innovation, such as intrapreneurship or ad hoc project
Minitel case. Even though its success is by now known to teams (Nonaka 1988b). Ethnographic studies of
everybody, its imitation entails that other PTrs learn systems and practices, and design processes that are
effectively and abandon - or at least discuss - their linked to the local idiosyncrasies of actors, settings and
entrenched beliefs about the function of Videotex, their circumstances (Suchman 1987; Zuboff 1988) are most
role as monopolists, their current practices in conceiving likely to succeed.
and developing systems, and so on. Rather than ques-
tioning such beliefs and the host of arrangements that 3. Establish systematic serendipity. In open experimen-
support them, they have reacted in a defensive way. They tation, designs are largelyincomplete, while implemen-
prefer to find reasons to explain away the Minitel success. tation and refinement intermingle constantly. Concep-
For example they cite the free terminals as the key success tion and execution tend to be concurrent or simul-
factor, forgetting that in most industrialized countries today taneous rather than sequential. This is an ideal
there is a sufficient installed base of PCs that would make context for serendipity to emerge and lead to unex-
the free distribution of terminals almost superfluous. Or pected solutions.
they suggest that a crucial role is played by pink e-mail
even though the latest statistics show that the messagerie 4. Thrive on gradual breakthroughs. In such a fluc-
rose has been only a temporary, though important, use of tuating environment, ideas and solutions are bound to
the system: These explanations reflecting old compe- emerge that do not square with established organiza-
tencies, in fact supported skilled incompetence (Argyris tional routines: deviations, incongruencies and
1982) in a way that undermines real commitment to mismatches will populate the design and development
innovation by the various European PTI's and keeps them agenda. This is the raw material for innovation;
attached to the status quo. management should appreciate and learn about such
emerging practices.
6. SIS PLANNING BY OXYMORONS Finally, to establish the pre-conditions for radical learning
and innovation:
How can we translate the theoretical reflections just
presented into practical guidelines for action? What is 5. Practice unskilled learning. If incremental learning
required is a novel approach to technological and Organi7:i. takes place within existing cognitive and organizational
tional innovation in a rapidly changing context (Brown arrangements and does not challenge them, it is
1991; Bikson and Eveland 1989; Hedberg and Jonsson condemned to provide solutions that are not innova-
1978). A way to generate continuously innovative SIS tive. The cognitive and organizational structures that
designs is to proceed by moves that may appear to the support learning can be challenged by actions, but this
current wisdom as oxymorons. Along this route, gaining may lead to "incompetent" behavior, as assessed in
new knowledge does not entail following a procedure or relation to old routines. On the other hand, manage-
actuating a plan, but fusing opposites in practice and being ment should value such behavior as an attempt to
exposed to the mismatches that are bound to occur (Sabel unlearn old ways of thinking and doing - one that may
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